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[C]hildren-allchildren, no matter where they arefrom-belong
on playgrounds, not battlegrounds.'

I. INTRODUCTION
"William," an 11-year-old boy in Uganda was forced to kill five
people as part of his indoctrination with the [Lord's Resistance
Army], with which he served for [two] years. The first time
William killed someone, he, along with other children, were forced
to bite to death one child who had attempted to escape from the
LRA. After the victim died of blood loss and shock from the
biting, William and others were then required to swallow the dead
child's blood. It was a warning to him and others not to try to
escape, or they would face the same torture. 2
The plight of child soldiers has caught people's attention around
the world.3 It is undeniably painful to visualize a young child carrying
an AK-47, prepared to shoot an enemy at a moment's notice. Stories
like William's open our eyes to the intolerable truth that youths are
being forced into wars around the world. Now that these children
1. Fortenberry, House of Foreign Affairs Committee Strengthen U.S. Child
Soldiers Policy, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES COMM. ON FOREIGN AFF.,

http://foreignaffairs.house.gov/news/blog/?2015 (last visited July 15, 2012)
[hereinafter Fortenberry,House ofForeign Affairs].
2. Casualties of War: Child Soldiers and the Law: Hearing Before the
Subcomm. on Human Rights and the Law, 110th Cong. 18 (2007) [hereinafter
Casualties of War] (statement of Joseph Mettimano, Director, Public Policy and
Advocacy, World Vision, Washington D.C.).
3. See, e.g., KONY 2012, http://www.kony2Ol2.com (last visited Aug. 24,
2012). In 2012, the non-profit agency Invisible Children released a video watched
by millions about the atrocities committed by Joseph Kony, the leader of the rebel
militia known as the Lord's Resistance Army. Kony 2012 Part I, KONY 2012,
http://www.kony2012.com/watch-the-movie (last visited Aug. 24, 2012) (discussing
the atrocities of Kony's Lord's Resistance Army and the plight of child soldiers).
Invisible Children's goal in spearheading the Kony 2012 campaign is to bring
awareness to the world about Joseph Kony as a war criminal, in hopes that the
global knowledge will help bring about Kony's arrest and trial in front of the
International Criminal Court. See Azry Groth, The Strategy for Ending LRA
Violence, INVISIBLE CHILD., http://blog.invisiblechildren.com/2012/04/05/thestrategy-for-ending-Ira-violence (last visited Aug. 24, 2012); see also Times Topics:
Joseph Kony, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 30, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com/top
/reference/timestopics/people/k/ joseph kony/index.html (describing Kony's crimes
and the international search for his arrest).
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have our attention, it is time to give them our help. The United States,
as a first-world nation and military superpower, is obligated to help
stop this horrid practice. While the wars are fought far from U.S. soil,
Americans are intertwined with these children in ways they do not at
first suspect. For example, American soldiers encounter child soldiers
on battlefields, placing military personnel in difficult ethical
predicaments. During the War on Terror, a fourteen-year-old boy
killed the first U.S. soldier to die in the war in Afghanistan.4
Beyond direct encounters with child soldiers on the battlefields,
U.S. foreign policies influence the plight of child soldiers in other
nations. Our position as one of the most powerful nations in the world
means that other countries often look to us for assistance, seeking
military financing, modem weapons, and our highly-valued military
training and education.5 "The United States is the world's largest
arms exporter" 6 and provides military aid, financing, and training to
war-torn countries around the globe.7 Before 2008, it was the U.S.
policy to provide military assistance to foreign governments
regardless of the human rights violations they committed by forcing
children to fight in wars. 8 In 2008, Congress passed the Child
4. Rachel Stohl, Child Soldiers Treaty Enters into Force, THE WKLY. DEF.
MONITOR (Ctr. for Def. Info., D.C.), Feb. 14, 2002 (describing the adoption and
ratification of the U.N. Optional Protocol to the Convention of the Rights of the
Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict) (on file with international
law journal).
5. Casualties of War, supra note 2, at 57 (written testimony submitted by
Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst, Center for Defense Information, Washington D.C.).
6. Id. For example, in 2005, "the United States was singlehandedly
responsible for 29 percent ($12.8 billion) of all arms transfer agreements and 46
percent ($11.6 billion) of all arms deliveries . . . ." Id.

7. Id. at 57-58.
8. See id. at 2. In 2007, the State Department identified ten countries whose
governments either recruited child soldiers or supported militias that recruited child
soldiers. All but one of these countries received U.S. military assistance that year.
Id. This is despite the fact that the U.S. told the U.N., in its written responses to
questions posed by the Committee on the Rights of the Child, that it consistently
considers human rights situations when reviewing countries to receive weapons
licenses or defense article sales. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Written Replies
by the Government of the United States of America Concerning the List of Issues to
be Taken Up in Connection with the Consideration of the Initial Report of the
United States of America Under Article 8, Paragraph 1 of the Optional Protocol to
the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed
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Soldiers Prevention Act (CSPA) to stop the United States from
handing over taxpayer money to governments that use it to finance
The CSPA amended the William Wilberforce
child soldiers. 9
Trafficking Protection Reauthorization Act to include a provision on
child soldiers.'o Former President George W. Bush signed the bill
into law on December 23, 2008, and it became effective on June 21,
2009." The CSPA prohibits the United States from sending military
aid to countries identified as actively recruiting and using child
soldiers in their official militaries or government-supported armed
forces. 12
Despite clear Congressional intent that the CSPA would prevent
our government from funding militaries that recruit child soldiers, a
presidential loophole renders the CSPA ineffective. This loophole
allows the President to waive the assistance prohibition if it is in the
"national interest of the United States." 3 Due to this waiver,
numerous countries known to recruit child soldiers have continued to
receive full or partial assistance for the past two years.14 Another
Conflict, U.N. Doc. CRC/C/OPACIUSA/Q/1/Add.1/Rev.
74 (June 2, 2008),
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/docs/AdvanceVersions/CRC.C.OPAC.US
A.Q. 1.Add. 1.Rev. 1.pdf.
9. Casualtiesof War, supra note 2, at 3.
The Trafficking Victims Protection
10. 22 U.S.C. § 2370c-1 (2006).
Reauthorization Act of 2008 is the third renewal of the original Victims of
Trafficking and Violence Protection Act of 2000. U.S. Laws on Trafficking in
Persons, U.S. DEP'T ST., http://www.state.gov/j/tip/laws/ (last visited Mar. 27,
2012). It authorizes federal programs and appropriations to combat human
trafficking both in the United States and abroad. Id.; see also H.R. REP. No. 110430, at 43 (2007) (House Report on the 2008 reauthorization).
11.

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 12 (2011),

availableat http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164224.htm#2.
12. 22 U.S.C. § 2370c-1.
13. Id.
14. On November 2, 2010, President Obama granted a waiver under the CSPA
to Sudan, Chad, Yemen, and the Congo. Lisa M. Ruth, Obama Grants Waiver on
Child Soldier Prohibition in Sudan, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2010),
http://communities.washingtontimes.com/neighborhood/lifelisa/ 2 010/nov/1/obamawaiver-child-soldier-prohibition-suda/; see discussion infra Part III.B.1-4. Then, on
October 4, 2011, President Obama issued another waiver with respect to Yemen,
Congo, and Chad. Avni Patel, Obama Waives Child Soldier Ban in Yemen and
Congo, ABC NEWS (Oct. 5, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/ obama-waiveschild-soldier-ban-yemen-congo/story?id=14663930; see discussion infra Part

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwilj/vol43/iss1/12

4

Carmody: The Child Soldiers Prevention Act: How the Act's Inadequacy Leave

2012]

THE CHILD SOLDIERS PREVENTION ACT

237

provision allows reinstatement of assistance if the country makes
changes to comply with the CSPA's terms (including signing an
action plan and demobilizing child soldiers).15 Of the six countries
identified by the State Department as having recruited child soldiers,' 6
The
four have received waivers or reinstatement of assistance.'
nearly
impossible
making
it
is
short
and
vague,
of
the
CSPA
language
for the President to implement its provisions according to Congress's
intent. If Congress wants the Act to help prevent war-torn countries
from recruiting child soldiers, the Act must be amended.
This comment argues that while the CSPA seeks to attain crucial
goals, the Act fails due its vague, ambiguous, and broad language.
Part II of this comment introduces a background to the human rights
abuses inflicted on child soldiers. It also discusses the two U.S.
statutes regarding child soldiers, and reviews international treaties
addressing child soldiers. Part III looks at the CSPA in detail,
including a summary of the State Department's identified countries
currently receiving assistance. It discusses the legislative history of
the CSPA and argues that while Congress criticizes the President for
not implementing its intent, the statute is too vague to blame its
ineffectiveness on the President. Part IV of the comment analyzes
whether the current application of the CSPA comports with the United
Nation's Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict. Last, Part V
provides recommendations to improve current legislation and to help
cease the use of child soldiers around the globe.

III.B.1-4.
15. 22 U.S.C. 2370c-1(d).
16. See infra Part II.A, for a list of these six countries.
17. U.S.: Don't Finance Child Soldiers-ObamaAdministration Aid Waivers
Undercut
U.S.
Law,
HUM.
RTs.
WATcE
(Oct.
4,
2011),
[hereinafter
http://www.hrw.org/news/2011/10/04/us-don-t-finance-child-soldiers
U.S.: Don't Finance Child Soldiers]; see supra text accompanying note 14; see
infra Part III.B.1-4, for a more in depth discussion.
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II. BACKGROUND ON THE PLIGHT OF CHILD SOLDIERS
A. Definitions, Statistics, andEffects of War on Child Soldiers
Human Rights Watch estimates that there are over 250,000
children exploited as child soldiers around the globe today." The
United Nations (U.N.) defines a child soldier as "any person[s] below
18 years of age ... recruited or used by an armed force or armed

group in any capacity .. . used as fighters, cooks, porters, spies or for
sexual purposes."' 9
This U.N. definition includes governmental forces, nongovernmental militias, and rebel groups. 20 One expert in 21st-century
warfare estimated that "[c]hildren as young as six years old now
comprise as much [sic] as 10% of the world's combatants," 21 and that
"[u]nderage soldiers serve in 75% of the world's conflicts." 22 Some
of the worst child soldier abuses have occurred in Liberia, Sierra
Leone, the Democratic Republic of Congo ("Congo"), Uganda,
Columbia, Sri Lanka, and Sudan.2 3 Each year, the U.S. State
18. Troy D. Green, Eradicatingthe Use of Child Soldiers: Is the World Doing
Enough?, 7 REGENT J. INT'L L. 395, 397 (2010). This estimated number is down
from 300,000 in 1999. If U.S. Opposes Child Labor, Why Not Child Soldiers?,
HuM. RTS. WATCH (June 28, 1999), http://www.hrw.org/news/ 1999/06/27/if-usopposes-child-labor-why-not-child-soldiers. As of May 2012, Human Rights Watch
has not issued a more recent estimate of child soldiers around the world. Due to the
fluid nature of internal armed conflicts that can start and end quickly, it is extremely
difficult to compile accurate statistics on the number of child soldiers used today.
Luz E. Nagle, Child Soldiers and the Duty of Nations to Protect Children From
Participationin Armed Conflict, 19 CARDOZO J. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 12 (2011)
(noting that the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers has stopped trying to
provide actual counts).
19. U.N. Children's Fund, The Paris Principles: The Principles and
Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups, 2.1 (Feb.
2007), http://childrenandarmedconflict.un.org/publications/ParisPrinciples-EN.pdf.
20. Green, supra note 18.
21. P.W. Singer, Talk is Cheap: Getting Serious About Preventing Child
Soldiers, 37 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 561, 562 (2004).

22. Id.
23. Green, supra note 18. Not surprisingly, these identified countries have
been involved in some of the world's bloodiest civil wars, and children are recruited
into the ranks of official militaries, government-supported militias, and rebel units.
Id. During Liberia's most recent civil war, aid workers estimated that 20,000
children were recruited as soldiers. Liberia's Child Soldiers Struggle to Rebuild
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Department issues its official list of countries that have government or
government-supported armed forces using child soldiers. 24 Since
2010, the State Department has identified countries such as Burma,
Chad, Congo, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen. 2 5 Further, during the War
on Terror, the United States directly confronted child soldiers in
Afghanistan and Iraq. 26 Currently, the al-Qaeda terrorist group is
known to recruit children as suicide bombers and snipers.
In countries that conscript child soldiers, "[c]hildren are used for
front-line combat, often as cannon fodder, and forced ahead of older
troops as human mine detectors." 28 In addition to using them in direct
combat, militaries force children to plant or clear mines, 29 smuggle
drugs across borders, 30 or serve as medics, guards, spies, or cooks.31
2003),
http://edition.cnn.com/2003/
(Aug.
31,
CNN.COM
Lives,
The wars have
WORLD/africa/08/3 1/liberia.child.soldiers.reut/index.html.
generally ended in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Sri Lanka. Questions and Answers,
CHILD SOLDIERS INT'L, http://www.child-soldiers.org/childsoldiers/ questions-andanswers (last visited Mar. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Q&A, CHILD SOLDIERS INT'L]. The
cessation of hostilities does not mean the end of struggles for child soldiers; children
released from the ranks have faced great adversities in reintegration and
rehabilitation. See, e.g., Lorea Russell & Elzbieta M. Godziak, Coming Home
Whole: Reintegrating Uganda's Child Soldiers, 7.2 GEORGETOWN J. INT'L AFFAIRS
57, 57-65 (explaining the need for a comprehensive psychosocial approach to
reintegration). As old wars cease, new wars arise, which explain the increased use
of child soldiers in Chad and Sudan. Q&A, CHILD SOLDIERS INT'L, supra.
24. See infra Part III, for a discussion of the State Department's complete
CSPA lists from 2010 to 2012.
25.

U.S.: Press Allies to End the Use of Child Soldiers, HUM. RTS. WATCH

(June 27, 2011), http://www.hrw.org/print/news/2011/06/27/us-press-allies-end-usechild-soldiers.
26. Green, supra note 18, at 397-98.
27. Id. For example, Omar Khadr was a fifteen-year-old child soldier,
suspected of committing terrorist-related activity for al-Qaeda when he was arrested
in Afghanistan in 2002. See Charlie Savage, Child Soldier for al-Qaeda is
Sentenced
for
War
Crimes,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Nov.
1,
2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/02/us/02detain.html.
28. Jo Becker, Child Soldiers: Changing a Culture of Violence, 32 HUM. RTS.
MAG. 16 (Winter 2005), available at www.americanbar.org/publications/
humanjrights-magazine-home/humanrights-vol32_2005/winter2005/hrwinterO5
_childsoldiers.html.
29. Nagle, supra note 18, at 14.
30. Diane A. Desierto, Leveraging InternationalEconomic Tools to Confront
Child Soldiering,43 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 337, 349 (2011).

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 2012

7

California Western International Law Journal, Vol. 43, No. 1 [2012], Art. 12

240

CALIFORNIA WESTERN INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43

Militaries not only recruit young boys into their ranks, but in 2006, the
United Nations University estimated that forty percent of child
soldiers were girls.32 Both male and female child soldiers are
subjected to sexual assault and are at high risk for contracting a
sexually transmitted disease.33 Girls are often forced to marry male
soldiers and sometimes endure forced abortions. 34
There is a nexus between a country's internal strife and use of
child soldiers that is primarily explained by a shortage of manpower. 35
The perpetual strife in countries constantly intensifies and abates,
making it impossible to pinpoint an exact number of child soldiers. 36
Child soldier recruitment is most common in poor countries in which
the bloody conflicts have killed many adult men. 37 Militaries can
31. Becker, supra note 28.
32. Vesselin Popovski & Karin Arts, Policy Brief International Criminal
Accountability and Children's Rights, U.N. UNW. 4 (2006), http://i.unu.edu/
media/publication/000/000/742/intemational-criminal-accountability-and-childrensrights-pb4-06.pdf.
33.

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 7 (2011),

available at http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164220.htm.
34. See Nagle, supra note 18, at 12-13.
35. Nancy Morisseau, Seen But Not Heard: Child Soldiers Suing Gun
Manufacturers Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 89 CORNELL L. REv. 1263, 1279
(2004).
36. Nagle, supra note 18, at 12.
37. See Morisseau, supra note 35; see also JIMMIE BRIGGS, INNOCENCE LOST:
WHEN CHILD SOLDIERS Go TO WAR 41 (2005) (explaining that, "[t]he more adult

males who are wounded, killed, or captured, the more youngsters will become the
inevitable recruiting pool."). For example, the bloody campaign in Uganda led by
the Lord's Resistance Army is one of the most well-known areas of child soldier
recruitment; this war began in the 1980s, continued for nearly twenty years, and
killed tens of thousands of people. Laura Blue & Jonathan Woodward, Hope for
Uganda's
Child
Soldiers?,
TIME
WORLD
(Aug.
14,
2006),
http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,1226297,00.html. In October 2011,
President Obama issued an order to send U.S. troops to Uganda and surrounding
countries to capture or kill the leader of the LRA, Joseph Kony. Jake Tapper & Luis
Martinez, Obama Sends 100 U.S. Troops to Uganda to Help Combat Lord's
Resistance Army, ABC NEWS (Oct. 14, 2011), http://abcnews.go.com/
blogs/politics/20 11/10/obama-sends-100-us-troops-to-uganda-to-combat-lordsresistance-army. As of May 2012, the troops have not found him. Craig Whitlock,
Joseph Kony Hunt is Proving Difficult for U.S. Troops, WASH. POST (Apr. 29,
2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/ world/national-security/joseph-kony-huntis-proving-difficult-for-ustroops/ 2012/04/29/glQAasM6pTstory.html.
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recruit children via force, conscription, or consent. 38 Recruiters prey
on vulnerable children because they are obedient and nalve, 39 and can
easily carry the light-weight arms used in modem conflict. 40 many
children are abducted or physically threatened.4 ' Others join out of
necessity-children who have lost their families and villages in the
war see no other choice because they must join to survive.4 2
Therefore, a child providing actual "consent" to be a soldier is dubious
at best, given the poverty that many of these children experience when
conflict occurs. 4 3
A child soldier's life causes physical and psychological trauma
that lasts long after leaving the ranks. Child soldiers are subjected to
dangerous environments and provided inadequate training; their
fragile bodies sustain far higher casualty and injury rates than their
adult counterparts do.4 4 In addition, military leaders frequently drug
child soldiers with alcohol, narcotics, and hallucinogens to deaden the
emotional reaction to killing and maiming, often creating child
addicts. 45 In Sierra Leone, commanders actually cut children's
temples and rubbed cocaine into the wounds. 46 One child soldier
recounted that "[t]he first time I went into battle I was afraid. But
after two or three days they forced us to start using cocaine, and then I
lost my fear." 4 7
Beyond the physical injuries and abuse, child soldiers often suffer
long-term psychological trauma.4 8 Former child soldiers from Uganda
exhibited signs of psychological disorders such as insomnia, eating
38. Morisseau, supra note 35, at 1279.
39. Nagle, supranote 18, at 9.
40. Morisseau, supra note 35, at 1285. For example,'the highly popular AK47 rifle weighs a mere 7.65 pounds unloaded and 9.46 pounds with a thirty round
magazine. KEVIN DOCKERY, FUTURE WEAPONS 102 (2007).
41. Morrisseau, supra note 35, at 1280.
42. Id. at 1280-81.
43. See id.
44. Nagle, supra note 18, at 15.
45. Id. at 10.
46. Monique Ramgoolie, Prosecution of Sierra Leone's Child Soldiers: What
Message is the U.N. Trying to Send?, 12 PRINCETON U. J. PUB. & INT'L AFF. 145,
148 (2001), availableat www.princeton.edu/jpia/past-issues-1/2001/8.pdf.
47. Nagle, supranote 18, at 10.
48. Id. at 15-16.
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disorders, and behavioral problems. 49 Child soldiers experience
desensitization to violence and pain due to drug use, brainwashing by
military leaders, and committing and witnessing horrific acts.s0 Some
child soldiers are forced to kill fellow recruits 1 or even their family
members upon the threat of death.5 2 The killing of family or village
members stigmatizes these children so that they cannot return home,
which in turn creates a dependency upon their leaders.53
In addition to the physical and psychological toll, child soldiers
experience a social stigma that makes it hard to reintegrate into
society. 5 4 Children abducted from their homes and communities at
such a young age lose the opportunity to attend school or learn
marketable skills. The trauma and unhealthy socialization skills that
child soldiers retain from combat make it extremely difficult for them
to adjust to civilian life if they are released.56 Inevitably, child
soldiers are "[o]stracized by their community, marginalized by lack of
education, and unable to find employment ... [leading them to] pick
up arms again and become a threat to their communities."5 7
B. Current U.S. Legislation
Congress adopted the CSPA in 2008,58 as an amendment to the
William Wilberforce
Trafficking
Victims Protection
and
49. Green, supranote 18, at 399.
50. Id. at 398-99.
51. Nagle, supra note 18, at 11. Commanders use children who attempt to
escape or defy instructions as a tactic to keep other child soldiers compliant and
fearful. See id. at 14 (describing the brutal account of one boy child soldier's
experience of killing another).
52. See Green, supra note 18, at 398-99.
53. Nagle, supra note 18, at 20.
54. Id. at 16-17.
55. Becker, supra note 28.
56. Nagle, supra note 18, at 16.
57. Russell & Godziak, supra note 23, at 58.
58. U.S. Limits Military Aid to Nations Using Child Soldiers, HUM. RTS.
WATCH (Dec. 11, 2008), http://www.hrw.org/news/2008/12/11/us-limits-militaryaid-nations-using-child-soldiers [hereinafter U.S. Limits Military Aid]; see NGO
Letter to President Obama regardingwaivers to the Child Soldiers Prevention Act,
HuM. RTs. WATCH (Nov. 5, 2010), http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/11/05/ngo-letterpresident-obama-regarding-waivers-child-soldiers-prevention-act; see also William
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Reauthorization Act of 2008.59 The CSPA, which went into effect in
2009, prohibits the U.S. government from providing military
assistance (including money, military education and training, or direct
sales of military equipment) to countries identified as having
government or government-supported forces that recruit and use child
soldiers.60
The CSPA also requires the U.S. Secretary of State to designate
portions of the annual Human Rights Report to the issue of child
soldiers. 6 1 The report must include "trends toward improvement ...
of the status of child soldiers" and "the role of the government" in
"engaging or tolerating" the practice. 62 The statute allows the
President to issue a "national interest waiver" for countries even if
they are in violation of the Act,6 3 so long as the President notifies
Congress within 45 days of the waiver and justifies his decision. 64
Additionally, the President has the authority to provide assistance if
that country has taken "steps" to come into compliance with the law
and has "implemented policies and mechanisms to prohibit and
prevent future . .. use of child soldiers."65
Wilberforce Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008, Pub. L.
110-457, 122 Stat. 5044 (codified as amended at 22 U.S.C. § 2370c-1 (2006)).
59. U.S. Limits Military Aid, supra note 58. Originally adopted in 2000, the
Trafficking Victims Protection Act was reauthorized three times, in 2003, 2005, and
again in 2008. U.S. Laws on Trafficking in Persons, U.S. DEP'T ST.,
http://www.state.gov/j/tip/laws/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2012). It is currently pending
reauthorization again, to extend the law for at least two more years. The Trafficking
Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2011-TVPRA Bill Tracker, IJM,
www.ijm.org/justice-campaigns/tvpra (last visited Feb. 4, 2012).
There are several other countries
60. 22 U.S.C. § 2370c-l(a) (2006).
identified as using child soldiers in rebel militias, but the CSPA only addresses child
soldier use within government and government-supported militaries because rebel
armies do not receive U.S. aid. By enacting this law, Congress hoped to begin a
process of "norm-building" so that rebel and paramilitary groups can no longer
attempt to justify their use of child soldiers by pointing to the actions of their own
governments. Casualties of War, supra note 2, at 13.
61. 22 U.S.C. § 2370c-2(b).
62.

Id.

63. Id. § 2370c-1(c)(1).
64. Id. § 2370c-1(c)(2).
65. Id. § 2370c-1(d). It also allows the President to provide assistance to help
countries that are "taking reasonable steps" to demobilize, rehabilitate, and
reintegrate former child soldiers. Id. § 2370c-1(e); see discussion infra Part V.
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In addition to the CSPA, Congress enacted the Child Soldier
Accountability Act (CSAA), making it a federal crime to knowingly
recruit or use soldiers under the age of 15.66 The statute makes
recruitment of child soldiers a war crime and gives the United States
universal jurisdiction over an alleged offender. 67 This means that U.S.
courts may prosecute alleged offenders found on U.S. soil, regardless
of their nationality or the location of the offense. 68 Both the CSPA
and the CSAA seek to promote the Trafficking Persons Protection
Reauthorization Act's goals, known as the "3 P's:" prevention,
protection, and prosecution. 69
C. InternationalTreaties & Their Inherent Limits
Outside of the United States, the international community
responded to human rights abuses inflicted on children by enacting the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). 70 The CRC was
adopted on November 20, 1989 and entered into force on September
2, 1990.n1 Currently, 193 countries have ratified the CRC. 72 Somalia
66. 18 U.S.C. § 2442(a) (2006); see Marsha L. Hackenberg, Can the Optional
Protocolfor the Convention on the Rights of the Child Protect the Ugandan Child
Soldier, 10 INDIANA INT'L & COMP. L. REv., 417, 429 (2000) (criticizing the CRC
for defining a child as under eighteen, while allowing children fifteen years and
older to participate in armed combat).
67. 18 U.S.C. § 2442(c) (2006).
68. Id.;

see

Universal

Jurisdiction,

AMNEsTY

INT'L,

www.amnesty.org/en/intemational-justice/issues/universal-jurisdiction (last visited
Feb. 4, 2012), for further information on the concept of universal jurisdiction.
69. Office to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons, The 3 Ps:
Prevention, Protection, Prosecution, U.S. DEP'T ST., http://www.state.gov/j/tip/
rls/fs/2011/167228.htm (last visited Mar. 23, 2012). While many governments
employ this paradigm in their efforts to combat human trafficking, in 2009,
Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton decided to include a fourth "P" partnership, which she announced will serve "as a pathway to achieve progress on
the 3Ps in the effort against modern slavery." Id.
70. U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, openedfor signature Nov. 20,
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter CRC],
availableat http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/pdf/crc.pdf
71. Id.
72. Treaty Status: Convention on the Rights of the Child, U.N. TREATY
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/ Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtd
sgno=IV-11&chapter-4&lang=en (last visited Mar. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Treaty
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and the United States 73 are the only two countries that have signed,
but have not ratified the Convention.7 4
Under the CRC, a child is anyone under eighteen years of age.7 s
The CRC requires that State Parties "take all feasible measures" to
ensure that children under eighteen do not engage in direct
hostilities. 76 It further prohibits State Parties from recruiting children
under fifteen into the armed forces.77 The CRC also imposes positive
obligations on State Parties to promote "recovery and social
reintegration of a child victim of... armed conflicts." 7 8
While the international community overwhelmingly accepted the
CRC, critics argue that the CRC fails to consider the complexities and
environments that contribute to the use of child soldiers. 79 This leads
to the practical difficulty of implementing its articles.so Indeed, State
Parties recently emerging from internal conflict may not have the
infrastructure and organizations necessary to address the long-term

Status: CRC].
73. Some arguments posed to explain why the United States has failed to ratify
the CRC include concerns about "sovereignty," "federalism," "reproductive and
family planning rights," and "parents' rights." See generally Lainie Rutkow &
Joshua T. Lozman, Suffer the Children?:A Callfor United States Ratification of the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 161,
168 (2006) (explaining the concerns U.S. critics have with the CRC and refuting
arguments against ratification).
74. Id. Signing a treaty signifies that the country intends to ratify it at some
later time. While it does not bind the signing party, it "creates an obligation, in the
period between signature and ratification, acceptance or approval, to refrain in good
faith from acts that would defeat the object and purpose of the treaty." Participating
in Multilateral Treaties, U.N. OFFICE OF LEGAL AFF., http://untreaty.un.org/olainternet/Assistance/handbook eng/ hbframeset.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2012)
(click "Participating in Multilateral Treaties").
75. CRC, supranote 70, art. 1.
76. Id. art. 38(2).
77. Id. art. 38(3).
78. Id. art. 39.
79. Jo de Berry, Child Soldiers and the Convention on the Rights of the Child,
575 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & Soc. ScL 92, 93-94 (2001). Jo de Berry argues that
a State Party cannot just implement the CRC on the state level (as a "state-crisis")
but must also consider social relations at the local level when discussing options for
peace. Id. at 103.
80. Id. at 92.
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needs of its former child soldiers. 8 ' Therefore, the international
community must act urgently and go beyond merely condemning the
practice in principle; it must take the initiative to help countries
reintegrate and rehabilitate these children.
In 2000, the U.N. Committee on the Rights of the Child adopted
the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on
the involvement of children in armed conflict. 82 This Optional
Protocol, entered into force on February 12, 2002, directly addresses
the need for extra protections for children involved in armed
conflict. 83 Unlike the CRC, the United States ratified the Optional
Protocol on December 22, 2002, and is therefore bound by its
articles. 84
The Optional Protocol places more stringent obligations on State
Parties than the original CRC. While the CRC requires States to
refrain from using children under fifteen in direct hostilities, the
Optional Protocol raises this age to eighteen.85 It also prohibits
compulsory recruitment of persons under eighteen into the armed
forces. 86 Further, the Optional Protocol directly addresses armed
groups not affiliated with a nation's government by prohibiting these
forces from recruiting or using soldiers in combat that are under
81. Nagle, supra note 18, at 10.
82. Optional Protocol to Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, opened for signature May 25, 2000,
2713
U.N.T.S.
222
[hereinafter
Optional
Protocol],
available at
http://www2.ohchr.org/english/law/crc-conflict.htm.
83. Id. pmbl.
84. Treaty Status: Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child on the Involvement of Childrenin Armed Conflict, U.N. TREATY COLLECTION,

http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsgno=IV- 11b&chapter-4&lang-en (last visited Mar. 24, 2012) [hereinafter Treaty Status:
Optional Protocol]. The United States ratified the Optional Protocol with several
"Declarations and Reservations," which are statements that "exclude or modify the
legal effect of a treaty provision." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2,
May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331. For example, it included notice that under U.S.
law, seventeen-year-old children may voluntarily join the military with parental
consent, and that by ratifying the treaty it will not subject the United States to the
jurisdiction of "any international tribunal, including the International Criminal
Court." Treaty Status: OptionalProtocol,supra (click hyperlink "United States" for
Declarations and Reservations expansion).
85. Optional Protocol, supra note 82, art. 1.
86. Id. art. 2.
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eighteen.87 In addition to the Protocol's prohibitions, this treaty places
positive obligations on States to implement measures to demobilize
any child soldiers in its forces and adopt national laws to criminalize
the practice.8 8
International treaties and instruments, such as the CRC and its
Optional Protocol regarding children in armed conflict, are valuable
and necessary tools to establish international norms. In addition, they
raise awareness, and in turn, the support of the international
community to collectively denounce human rights abuses. However,
these treaties are limited in scope and nature, and they tend to be
idealistic rather than practicable. The U.N.'s mechanisms only bind
State Parties that ratify the treaties; it therefore has no authority over
countries that are not parties to the Convention or are non-state
entities, such as rebel militias recruiting child soldiers. 89 It relies on
the State Parties themselves to implement its doctrines and prevent
human rights abuses around the world. Therefore, most of the
responsibility in preventing such abuses lies with the individual
countries themselves.
While the U.N. views its treaties and conventions as binding on
State Parties, it has no police power mechanism to enforce its
decisions; therefore, the CRC and its Optional Protocol are "limited
by the signatories' willingness to comply." 90 The CRC, like other
conventions, relies on a reporting system.9 ' Each State Party submits
a report every five years illustrating how that country has taken
measures to implement the CRC's rights. 9 2 The Committee on the
Rights of the Child then disseminates reports back to those countries,
which make suggestions and recommendations for improved

compliance. 93
87. Id. art. 4(1).
88. Id. arts. 4(2), 6(1).
89. Chapter Four: Becoming a Party to the Convention and Optional
ENABLE,
http://www.un.org/disabilities/
NATIONS
UNITED
Protocol,
default.asp?id=231 (last visited May 5, 2012).
90. Susan O'Rourke Von Struensee, Violence, Exploitation, and Children:
Highlights of the United Nations Children's Convention and InternationalResponse
to Children'sHuman Rights, 18 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REV. 589, 590 (1995).
91. Hackenberg, supra note 66, at 429.
92. CRC, supra note 70, art. 44.
93. Hackenberg, supra note 66. Certain U.N. committees, such as the Human
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The CSPA is meant to complement and further the goals of these
international treaties. The CRC and its Optional Protocol have
inherent limits that make implementing procedures to abolish the use
of child soldiers unattainable without local and national efforts. The
United States has the ability to convince foreign governments that
using child soldiers is not only morally reprehensible but also
financially inadvisable if it wishes to be eligible for U.S. military aid.

III.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE CHILD SOLDIERS PREVENTION ACT

A. The CSPA's Efficacy in Eradicatingthe Use of Child Soldiers
Although the international community has condemned the use of
child soldiers, military recruiters continue to defy these international
norms. Moral condemnation or treaties prohibiting child soldiers
often fall on deaf ears in countries that are torn by internal conflict,
civil war, and poverty. Recruiters "have reached such a state of
violence that all standards of moral and ethical conduct cease to exist
or hold meaning." 94 Releasing child soldiers may be seen as
impractical to a militia embroiled in a civil war, where "replenishing
combatants is a constant preoccupation." 95
The CSPA's inherent value is that its prohibition is set out in
economic and political terms, rather than relativistic moral or ethical
ideals. The CSPA's prohibition both economically incentivizes and
punishes countries that continue to recruit and use child soldiers in its
forces. As a global power, the United States exerts great influence
over other governments around the world. 96 Countries across the
Rights Committee, accept individual complaints from persons whose human rights
have been violated. Human Rights Bodies, Complaint Procedures, OFFICE U.N.
HIGH

COMMISSIONER

HUM.

RTS.,

http://www2.ohchr.org/

englishIbodies/petitions/index.htm (last visited May 9, 2012). While the CRC and
its Optional Protocols do not yet accept such complaints, the Committee has
proposed a Third Optional Protocol, which would permit the Committee to receive
individual complaints from children. Committee on the Rights of the Child, OFFICE
U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER HUM. RTs., http://www2.ohchr.org/ english/bodies/crc/
(last visited May 5, 2012).
94. Nagle, supra note 18, at 26.
95. Id.
96. Casualties of War, supra note 2, at 57 (written testimony submitted by
Rachel Stohl, Senior Analyst, Center for Defense Information, Washington D.C.).
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globe are eager to receive weapons and other military assistance from
However, countries that continue to commit
our government.
human rights abuses should not be rewarded with highly valued
military aid because it renders the CSPA ineffective.
B. Trafficking in PersonsReport as a Guide to Country Compliance
The CSPA prohibits the U.S. government from sending certain
types of military assistance to foreign governments that use or support
the use of child soldiers. This aid is comprised of Foreign Military
Financing (FMF), International Military Education and Training
(IMET), licenses for direct commercial sales of weapons, and
transfers of excess defense articles. 98 In 2011, in an effort to
strengthen the CSPA, Congress proposed an amendment to
incorporate Peacekeeping Operation funds into the current prohibition

provision.99
To determine which countries should be prohibited from receiving
the above-specified military assistance, the CSPA requires the State
Department to investigate countries alleged to be using child soldiers
and include it in its annual Trafficking in Persons Report ("TIP
Report").' 00 While the TIP Report addresses a country's human
trafficking situation as a whole, the President uses the report to
determine if and how each country is addressing its child soldier
problem. To measure a country's efforts to combat human trafficking
abuses, the State Department places each country into a tier.ot Tier 1
97. Id.
98. U.S. Limits Military Aid, supra note 58. Excess defense articles are
articles from the Department of Defense and U.S. Coast Guard that the U.S. Armed
Forces no longer needs and therefore declares excess. Excess Defense Articles
Program,

BUREAU

OF

INDUSTRY

AND

SECURITY,

http://beta-

www.bis.doc.gov/index.php/other-areas/strategic-industries-and-economic-securitysies/excess-defense-articles-program (last visited Mar. 30, 2012). The Defense
Security Cooperation Agency then offers these articles to foreign governments or
international organizations, often to help U.S. allies modernize their military
programs.

Excess Defense Articles, DEF. SECURITY COOPERATION AGENCY,

http://www.dsca.mil/programs/ eda/edamain.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2012).
99. S. 1259, 112th Cong. § 3 (as introduced in Senate, June 22, 2011).
100. 22 U.S.C. 2151n(f) (2006).
101.

U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 11 (2011),

availableat http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011/164222.htm.
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"indicates that a government has acknowledged the existence of
human trafficking, has made efforts to address the problem, and meets
the [Trafficking Victims Protection Act] minimum standards." 02 Tier
2 includes countries that have yet to fully comply with Trafficking
Victims Protection Act (TVPA) standards but are making significant
efforts to do so.'o 3 Countries on the Tier 2 Watch List have made
significant efforts to comply with the TVPA, but are at risk of falling
into Tier 3.104 Tier 3 is the lowest ranking and describes governments
that "do not fully comply with the minimum standards and are not
making significant efforts to do so."o105
In June 2011, the State Department issued its annual TIP Report,
which identified the following six governments that are prohibited
from receiving U.S. military aid under the CSPA: Burma, Chad,
Congo, Sudan, Somalia, and Yemen.106
In addition, the State Department categorized Burma,'0 7 Sudan,1 08
and Yemen 0 9 as Tier 3 countries. The State Department labeled
Chad"o and Congo"' Tier 2 Watch List countries as they are making
efforts to come into compliance with the TVPA but are at significant
risk of falling back into Tier 3. It labeled Somalia a "special case"
because the country has lacked a central government since 1991.112
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. Risk factors considered when placing a country on the Watch List
include a significant or increasing "absolute number of victims," a "failure to
provide evidence of increasing efforts," or a mere promise by the country "to take
additional steps over the next year." Id
105. Id.
106. U.S.: Don't FinanceChild Soldiers, supra note 17.
107. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 104 (2011)

[hereinafter TIP 2011], availableat http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2011.
108. Id. at 335.
109. Id. at 387.
110. Id. at 117.
111. Id. at 132.
112. Id. at 395. In a recent Trafficking in Persons Report, published in June
2012, the U.S. State Department once again categorized Somalia as a Special Case.
U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING INPERSONS REPORT 379, 379 (2012) [hereinafter

TIP 2012], available at http://www.state.gov/ j/tip/rls/tiprpt/2012/index.htm (scroll
to "PDF Format"). The report notes that the lack of a unified centralized
government makes it extremely difficult for the country to address its human
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Of these six countries, all but Burma and Somalia have received
otherwise prohibited U.S. military assistance under the CSPA.1 13 For
example, in 2011 the State Department requested $35 million in FMF
for Yemen.1 14 This is only a small portion of the "total military,
security and other assistance . . ." provided to Yemen,

". ..

which has

exceeded $100 million annually in recent years.""' The Human
Rights Watch child rights activist Jo Becker argues that the issuance
of these waivers "show a lack of leadership and a disregard for U.S.
law."'16
It may be telling to note that five of the six countries on the State
Department's list have actually ratified the CRC, 1 7 a step which even
the United States has not yet taken. Chad, Congo, and Yemen further
ratified the more stringent Optional Protocol on the Involvement of
Children in Armed Conflict.118 Yet, since their ratifications, credible
reports cite the use of child soldiers in these countries as recently as
2010.119 Countries may be motivated to ratify such treaties for public
relations reasons, but have little economic or political incentive to
adhere to its mandates.1 20 In 1999, this occurred in Columbia, where a
guerilla force agreed with the U.N. Special Representative to stop
recruiting soldiers under age fifteen, but never carried out its

promise.121
The TIP Reports summarize each country's progress toward
demobilizing and eliminating the use of children in their ranks, and
trafficking issues. Id. Further, it limits the amount of accurate data that the State
Department can collect regarding the trafficking issue. Id. However, the report
notes that during the reporting period, the U.N. estimates about "[forty-six] incidents
of unlawful recruitment and use of soldiers by the T[ransitional] F[ederal]
G[overnment] and its allied militia in July and August 2011." Id. at 380.
113. U.S.: Don't FinanceChild Soldiers, supra note 17.
114. Id.
115. Patel, supra note 14.
116. U.S.: Don't FinanceChild Soldiers, supra note 17.
117. Treaty Status: CRC, supra note 72.
118. Treaty Status: OptionalProtocol,supra note 84.
119. See TIP 2011, supra note 107, at 117-19, 132-34, 387-88. Congo ratified
the CRC in 2001, Chad in 2002, and Yemen in 2007. Treaty Status: Optional
Protocol,supra note 84.
120. Nagle, supra note 18, at 26; see also Desierto, supra note 30, at 347.
121. Nagle, supra note 18, at 26.
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the government's role in either combatting or accepting the use of
child soldiers.12 2 The President uses these reports when he considers
applying waivers or reinstatement of assistance to countries. 123
Despite slow progress from these countries (if any at all), President
the State Department's
Obama has seemingly ignored
recommendations, and he has issued waivers and reinstated assistance,
even though there is little evidence to indicate that the country should
receive such benefits.
In June 2012, the State Department released the 2012 TIP Report,
with a few changes from 2011.124 In particular, seven countries have
now been listed under the CSPA as prohibited from receiving military
assistance: Burma, Libya, Congo, South Sudan, Somalia, Sudan, and
Yemen.125 Notably, Chad-on the CSPA list in both 2010 and
2011-has been taken off the list, meaning that it is no longer
prohibited from receiving assistance.126 Further, Libya and the newly
created South Sudan are on the list for the first time.127
On September 28, 2012, President Obama again issued a
Presidential Determination with respect to the CSPA of 2008.128 Of
the seven listed countries, President Obama authorized full waivers for
Libya, South Sudan, and Yemen (two of which had been on the CSPA
list for less than four months before they received waivers).129
Further, he authorized a partial waiver for Congo.' 30 However, while
the President's full Memorandum of Justification has been submitted
to Congress, it has not yet been published. Therefore, the majority of
this paper focuses on 2010 and 2011, years during which President
Obama issued waivers and justifications for countries prohibited from
receiving U.S. military assistance since the CSPA's inception. The
122. 22 U.S.C. § 2370c-2(b) (2006).
123. See id. § 2370c-2(c).
124. See generally TIP 2012, supra note 112.
125. Id. at 36.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Presidential Determination No. 2012-18, 77 Fed. Reg. 196, 51509 (Sept.
28, 2012) [hereinafter Presidential Determination 2012].
129. Id.
130. Id. The partial waiver "allow[s] for continued provision of [IMET] funds
and nonlethal Excess Defense Articles, and the issuance of licenses for direct
commercial sales of U.S. origin defense articles ..... Id.
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following four countries have received military assistance in the past
two years, despite their designation as countries utilizing child
soldiers.
1. Chad
Chad's political instability and violence arises both from civil
wars and conflict with neighboring nations. 131 Since Chad established
its independence from France in 1960, it has experienced almost
constant conflict.13 2 In the mid-1960s, a tax revolt in Northern Chad
resulted in two competing guerilla factions vying for government
control.' 3 3 Violent conflict continued in Chad throughout the 1970s
and 1980s, stemming predominantly from ethnic factions between the
north and the south. 134 In 1990, the current president, Idriss D6by
Itno, rose to power, resulting in intense opposition from ethnic
factions and attempts to overthrow the government.135
In addition to the civil war, the Sudanese Darfur conflict spilled
over into Chad in 2004.136 Thousands of Sudanese escaped Sudan and
sought refuge in Chad, and the Chadian army and Sudanese militias
became embroiled in bloody conflict.13 7
The border conflict
continued until 2010, when Sudan and Chad held peace talks, agreed
to cease conflict, and jointly patrol their shared border.138
In 2010 and 2011, the TIP Reports have placed Chad on the Tier 2
Watch List.139 After promising the U.N. that it would release all
detained child soldiers in 2008, Chad slowly began the process of
131. See CHILD SOLDIERS INT'L, BETTER THAN CURE: PREVENTING THE
RECRUITMENT AND USE OF CHILDREN INTHE CHADIAN NATIONAL ARMY 5-7 (2012)
[hereinafter BETTER THAN CURE].
132. See Africa-Chad Profile, BBC NEWS (Aug. 23, 2012, 4:18 PM),
http:www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13164690 [hereinafter ChadProfile].
133. See id.
134. See BETTER THAN CURE, supra note 131, at 5.

135. Id.; see also ChadProfile,supra note 132.
136. BETTER THAN CURE, supra note 131, at 5; see also Chad Profile, supra
note 132.
137. Chad Profile, supra note 132.
138. Id.; see also BETTER THAN CURE, supra note 131, at 5.
139. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 108 (2010)
available at http://www.state.gov/j/tip/rls/tiprpt
2010],
TIP
[hereinafter
/2010/142759.htm; TIP 2011, supra note 107, at 117.
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demobilization. 140 The 2010 TIP Report noted that conscription of
child soldiers had decreased from the previous year, 14 1 and the 2011
Report cited no new instances of child soldier recruitment. 142 Most
recently in June 2011, the government of Chad signed an action plan
with the U.N. to demobilize child soldiers from its ranks.14 3 The 2011
TIP Report does not clearly indicate how many child soldiers remain
in the Chadian military. 144 The Chadian government has made
improvements in the area of abolishing the use of child soldiers, but
its Tier 2 Watch List designation likely signifies that it has not made
enough efforts to combat other forms of human trafficking.145
On October 25, 2010, President Obama issued a full waiver of the
CSPA prohibition for Chad because doing so was in the "national
interest" of the United States.146 He justified the full waiver by
asserting that the Act's restrictions would limit the U.S. government's
ability to "reinforce positive trends within the Chadian Government,"
including UNICEF-coordinated progress to demobilize children from
the ranks of the Chadian National Army.147 He further argued that the
prohibition would harm Chad's relationship with the United States, as
Chad is an ally that continues to cooperate in the efforts to combat

140. Chad, Central African Republic: UN Envoy Welcomes Release of Child
2008),
http://www.un.org/
2,
(June
NEWS
SERV.
Soldiers, U.N.
apps/news/story.asp?NewslD=26881&Cr-child&Crl=&Kwl=COOMARASWAM
Y&Kw2=&Kw3=#.
141. TIP 2010, supranote 139, at 108.
142. TIP 2011,supranote 107, at 117.
143. Child Soldiers: Commitments Must Now Be Turned to Action, CHILD
SOLDIERS

INT'L

(Apr.

16,

2012),

http://www.child-soldiers.org/

BetterthanCure.Press-release. 16April2012.pdf.
144. TIP 2011, supra note 107, at 117-19.
145. Id. at 119. The U.S. State Department kept Chad categorized under the
Tier 2 Watch List in its 2012 Trafficking in Persons Report, despite removing it
from the CSPA list. TIP 2012, supra note 112, at 115. The TIP Report cites no new
instances of child soldier conscription since mid-2010. Id. Chad remains on the
Watch List because the "government did not show evidence of overall increasing
efforts over the previous year" in addressing its human trafficking and child soldiers
problem. Id.
146. Presidential Determination No. 2011-04, 75 Fed. Reg. 234, 75856 (Oct.
25, 2010) [hereinafter Presidential Determination 2010].
147. Id.
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terrorism. 148 Critics of Obama's waivers resounded strong concerns
because President Obama seemingly placed combatting terrorism
above the need to combat the use of child soldiers. 149
One year later in 2011, President Obama fully reinstated
assistance to Chad and certified to Congress that Chad has taken
"actual steps to [comply]" with the Act.o50 By reinstating unrestricted
aid to Chad so shortly after it signed the action plan, the President has
aroused valid concerns from within the international community.
Several human rights activists stated that it was "too early to tell how
effective the demobilization efforts will be." 5
In April 2012, a nonprofit activist group, Child Soldiers
International, published a report on Chad's current efforts to combat
child soldier recruitment.15 2 The report highlights the difficulties the
Chadian government has had in implementing widespread policies
against the use of child soldiers, and cautions that the "security
environment remains conducive to the recruitment and use of
children."1 5 3 Chad has taken few concrete steps to implement the
action plan since June 201 1.154 For example, it failed to implement
effective age-verification procedures for soldier recruitment,
criminalize the use of children in armed forces, or hold any members
of the Chadian Army accountable for their actions."' Chad's lack of
progress provides evidence that President Obama may have
prematurely reinstated full assistance.

148. Id.
149. See Michelle Chen, White House Says Child Soldiers Are Ok, if They
Fight Terrorists, COLORLINES (Nov. 15, 2010), http://colorlines.com/archives/
2010/1 1/did youget obamasmemowhitehouse selectively okays child soldier
s.html.
150. Presidential Determination No. 2012-01, 76 Fed. Reg. 206, 65928 (Oct.
4, 2011) [hereinafter Presidential Determination 2011].
151. Patel, supra note 14.
152. See BETTER THAN CURE, supra note 131.
153. Id. at 2 (emphasizing the precarious political environment, the report
ominously predicts that "any ... return to violence in Chad could see a renewal of
recruitment and use of children in armed conflict.").
154. Child Soldiers: Commitments Must Now Be Turned to Action, supra note
143.
155. BETTER THAN CURE, supra note 131, at 2.
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These concerns of premature reinstatement of assistance are
compounded by the fact that the State Department removed Chad
from the CSPA list in 2012.156 The 2012 TIP Report continues to
categorize Chad as a Tier 2 Watch List country,' 5 7 but the CSPA no
longer prohibits it from receiving military assistance. Since the CSPA
entered into force, Chad has not been held accountable through the
CSPA's prohibition for its child soldier recruitment policies.
President Obama issued a full waiver in 2010, reinstated full
assistance in 2011, and the State Department removed Chad from the
list entirely in 2012. This means that the CSPA's prohibition has
never affected Chad, even when it was on the list.
2. Congo
Since its independence in 1960, Congo has faced civil war and
ethnic violence.' 5 8 Violence in Congo stems from conflict in several
African nations. From 1998 to 2003, Congo became embroiled in
what some call "Africa's world war," involving Angola, Namibia and
Zimbabwe fighting against Uganda and Rwandan rebels.1 59 Despite
peace agreements among certain rebel armies, sporadic upsurges of
violence continue to plague Congo.' 60 As a result, Congo's political
instability continues to create an environment that fosters human
trafficking and child soldier recruitment.
The Secretary of State categorized Congo as Tier 3 in the 2011
TIP Report.161 Throughout 2010, Congo's government military, the
ForcesArmees de la Republique Dimocratiquedu Congo (French for
the "Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Congo") continued
to abduct children to serve in their ranks.162 The Report confirmed,
"121 ... cases of... child soldier recruitment" in three months in
156. See TIP 2012, supra note 112, at 36.
157. Id. at 115.
158. Africa-Democratic Republic of Congo Profile, BBC NEWS (May 29,
2012, 6:44 PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-13283212.
15 9. Id.
160. See id.
161. TIP 2011, supra note 107, at 129. The U.S. State Department has once
again placed Congo in Tier 3 in its 2012 Trafficking in Persons Report. TIP 2012,
supra note 112, at 125.
162. TIP 2011, supra note 107, at 129.
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Some army commanders continue to prevent the
2010.163
demobilization of children within their ranks, and several commanders
identified in previous reports continue to serve in their positions
without any investigation or discipline regarding their conduct. 164
Most recently, the 2012 TIP Report indicates that although Congo
formed a ministerial committee to create and sign a U.N. action plan
regarding child soldiers, no action planned has been signed.165
In 2010, President Obama issued a full CSPA waiver for
Congo;166 in 2011, he restricted some funding by issuing a partial
waiver that will provide certain types of assistance and sales of some
military equipment. 167 To date, the United States has not issued a
complete waiver because Congo's government has resisted signing a
U.N. action plan, failed to demobilize children, and openly promoted
The
officers known for their recruitment of child soldiers.' 6 8
President feels that a full prohibition on military assistance would
hinder the United States and Congo's ability to professionalize the
Congo military and stabilize the country. 169
3. Sudan
Similar to the countries above, Sudan has been plagued by civil
war and political unrest. 7 0 Before the South seceded and became
South Sudan in 2011, the North-South civil war killed approximately
1.5 million people."' In addition, ethnic violence arose in the western
163. Id.
164. Id. at 130. According to the 2012 TIP Report, several Congolese national
army ("FARDC") commanders continued to hold leadership positions throughout
the 2012 TIP reporting period, despite accusations they recruited children into their
ranks. TIP 2012, supra note 112, at 125.
165. TIP 2012, supra note 112, at 125.
166. Presidential Determination 2010, supra note 146.
167. Presidential Determination 2011, supra note 150.
168. U.S.: Don't Finance ChildSoldiers, supra note 17.
169. Presidential Determination 2011, supra note 150. In 2012, the President
again issued a partial waiver for Congo, allowing the country to receive some types
of military assistance, such as IMET funds. Presidential Determination 2012, supra
note 128.
170. See Sudan Country Profile-Overview, BBC NEWS (May 1, 2012, 6:18
PM), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094995.
171. Id.
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Sudanese area of Darfur when Arab militias employed ethnic
cleansing against non-Arab citizens.172 The conflict, which began in
2003 and lasted until 2008, is estimated to have killed over 200,000
people.173 The Darfur conflict impacted not only Sudan, but
neighboring Chad, which became involved in border disputes after
Darfur refugees spilled into Chad seeking safety. 174
The 2011 TIP Report lists Sudan as Tier 3.175 Although Sudan's
first civil war ended in 2005, U.N. personnel continued to see children
dressed in the government's military uniform, carrying weapons, and
participating actively in military-related duties as late as 2010.176 n
the most recent TIP Report, issued in 2012, the State Department
noted that child soldiers continue to be conscripted by government
Some
security forces and government-supported militias.177
demobilization apparently began after 2005, but efforts are far from
complete and the State Department still does not know how many
children remain with the Government of Southern Sudan's army.178
According to the 2012 TIP Report, Sudan's government has not yet
signed an action plan with the U.N. 179
Basing the justification on the 2010 TIP Report, President Obama
issued a full waiver of the CSPA for Sudan in 2010, noting that the
Sudanese People's Liberation Army promised to prevent recruitment
of, and demobilize children from its ranks.' 8 0 Interestingly, the
President did not include Sudan in its Presidential Determination of
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id.; see discussion infra Part III.B.1.
175. TIP 2011, supra note 107, at 335. In the U.S. State Department's most
recent TIP Report, Sudan remains categorized in Tier 3. TIP 2012, supra note 112,
at 323.
176. TIP 2011, supra note 107, at 335.
177. TIP 2012, supra note 112, at 323.
178. TIP 2011, supra note 107, at 335-36.
179. TIP 2012, supra note 112, at 323. This is not to be confused with South
Sudan, whose military signed an action plan with the U.N. in March 2012. South
Sudan's Army Signs Pact with U.N.to Release All Children Within its Ranks, U.N.
NEWS CENTRE (Mar. 12, 2012), http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?News
ID=41512. However, the State Department listed South Sudan on its 2012 CSPA
list of countries that should not receive military assistance under the CSPA. TIP
2012, supra note 112, at 36.
180. Presidential Determination 2010, supra note 146.
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waivers for 2011181 or 2012.182 The 2012 TIP Report concluded that
Sudan's militias and security forces continued to conscript child
soldiers and failed to sign a proposed action plan with the U.N.183
4. Yemen
Conflict in Yemen increased in 2011, after an uprising inspired by
the Arab Spring caused "hundreds of death and rising chaos" in efforts
to overthrow the authoritarian president.184 After the uprising, 2011
brought a change of leadership, as well as increased attacks by an alQaeda group, that has struggled for power since it had to close its
bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan.' 85 The Yemeni government
continues to struggle against al-Qaeda factions, who align with
Yemeni rural tribes in the outskirts of the country.18 6
Yemen dropped from the Tier 2 Watch List to Tier 3 in the 2011
TIP Report.1 87 Despite a Yemeni law stipulating that persons must be
at least eighteen to serve in their armed forces, credible reports have
surfaced that government armed forces and government-allied militias
continue to conscript children.' 88 The report states that "a local NGO
estimated that children under .. . 18 may make up more than half of
some tribes' armed forces."' 8 9 In the 2012 TIP Report, the State
Department states that "[t]he number of child soldiers [recruited into
the government armed forces, government supported militias, and
rebel militias] reportedly increased" during the 2011-2012 reporting
period.190 While President Obama acknowledged Yemen's human
181. Presidential Determination 2011, supra note 150.
182. Presidential Determination 2012, supra note 128.
183. TIP 2012, supra note 112, at 323.
184. Topics-Yemen, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 6, 2012), http://topics.nytimes.com/
top/news/international/countriesandterritories/yemen/index.html [hereinafter
Topics-Yemen].
185. Yemen Profile-Overview, BBC NEWS (Sept. 12, 2012 5:43 PM),
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east- 14704852.
186. Topics-Yemen, supra note 184.
187. Compare TIP 2010, supra note 139, at 352, with TIP 2011, supra note
107, at 387.
188. TIP 2011, supra note 107, at 387.
189. Id. This estimate was repeated in the 2012 TIP Report for Yemen. TIP
2012, supra note 112, at 374.
190. TIP 2012, supra note 112, at 374.
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rights abuses regarding child soldiers, he issued full national interest
waivers to Yemen in both 2010191 and 2011.192 He justified these
waivers by citing the Yemeni government's vital cooperation in
counterterrorism operations against al-Qaeda.1 93
C. Interpretationof the CSPA
It is clear that the Legislature intended the CSPA to be more
effective than it has proven to be in reality. Congressman Jeff
Fortenberry, one author of the CSPA, issued a press release in June
2011 that urged President Obama to seriously enforce the statute
because the countries that were granted the 2010 waivers made
insufficient progress in combatting their use of child soldiers.' 9 4 It is
further obvious that the authors of the statute are exasperated because
the President is not effectuating Congress's intent in implementing the
law. After the 2011 waivers, Congress tried to enhance the CSPA by
proposing an amendment that would require the President to provide
Congress a report no later than fifteen days before issuing another
waiver. 195 The report is to specify "what credible and verifiable steps"
violating countries are taking to prevent further recruitment of child
soldiers and how it is demobilizing current child soldiers.' 96 The
proposed amendment also adds Peacekeeping Operation Funds to the
list of prohibited military assistance.19 7

191. Presidential Determination 2010, supra note 146.
192. Presidential Determination 2011, supra note 150. In 2012, the President
again granted a full waiver to Yemen. Presidential Determination 2012, supra note
128. Presumably, his reasons for doing so are the same as in 2010 and 2011, due to
the ongoing counterterrorism efforts of the United States; however, the President's
Memorandum of Justification has yet to be released to the public.
193. Presidential Determination 2010, supra note 146; Presidential
Determination 2011, supra note 150.
194. Fortenberry,Author of Child Soldiers Prevention Act, comments on 2011
Human Trafficking Report, CONGRESSMAN JEFF FORTENBERRY (Jun. 28, 2011),

http://fortenberry.house.gov/index.php?option=com content&task=
view&id=3541&Itemid=300032.
195. H.R. 3589, 112 'b Cong. (as introduced in the House of Representatives,
Dec. 7, 2011).
196. Fortenberry,House ForeignAffairs, supranote 1.
197. Id.
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The above amendment, while improving the statute's
enforceability to some degree, will not completely fix the flaws in the
statute's wording. A prima facie reading of the statute illustrates that
the fault predominantly lies with the severely brief and vague
language that comprises the prohibition and its limitations. The
statute purports to establish a general ban on certain military
assistance to governments identified as recruiting child soldiers, with a
national interest waiver. While Congress argues that the waiver was
intended to be "rare and temporary," 198 the statute's language does not
evidence this restricted use. The waiver's language in its entirety
states that "[t]he President may waive the application to a country of
the prohibition in subsection (a) if the President determines such
waiver is in the national interest of the United States."1 99 Read on its
face, the statute gives the President absolute discretion to determine
what constitutes a situation that is in the "national interest of the
United States." 200
Congress's assertion, that the President is failing to implement the
CSPA according to their intentions, begs the question, what did
Congress intend when it authored the statute? It is extremely difficult
to ascertain the legislators' intent, on the statute's face, because the
"plain meaning" 201 of the language leaves much to be desired. The
statute fails to define "national interest," or explain what "steps" a
country must complete to have assistance reinstated. Nor does the
statute indicate what constitutes "reasonable steps to implement
effective measures to demobilize child soldiers. . . ."202 It would seem,
therefore, that the same body who issues the waivers, the executive
branch, has discretion to define these vague terms.
A review of the legislative history sheds little light on legislative
intent regarding the CSPA. The Committee on the Judiciary of the
United States Senate held a hearing on the child soldier issue in early

198. Id.
199. 22 U.S.C. § 2370c-l(c)(1) (2006).
200. Id. § 2370c-1(c)(1).
201. A legal term of art, "plain meaning" means "[t]he meaning attributed to a
document ... by giving the words their ordinary sense, without referring to extrinsic
indications of the author's intent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1069-70 (9th ed.
2009).

202. 22 U.S.C. § 2370c-l(e)(1)(A) (emphasis added).
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2007, when the CSPA was first being developed.2 0 3 This hearing
illustrated Congress's general intent to implement a law that would
prevent further use of child soldiers by using the United States'
influence as a military superpower. 204 Congress did not want U.S.
taxpayer dollars funding militaries that recruit children, and therefore
found that withholding much-needed military aid from these
governments would pressure these countries into complying with
international human rights standards.2 0 5
Beyond the general intent of Congress's goals in developing the
CSPA, the rest of the legislative history is decidedly silent, especially
regarding the interpretation of specific terms used throughout the
statute. A review of the Congressional Reports, records, and both
House and Senate versions of the proposed statute reveal that it passed
with relatively little debate and change. Upon a final review of the
CSPA, before being sent to the President, Congressman Howard
Berman explained to the House that both the House and Senate
versions were "substantially similar." 206
One change was made to the enacted statute that differed from the
earlier versions; this may proffer some evidence of Congressional
intent regarding what are valid justifications that allow the President
to issue a "national interest waiver." In the House Committee's
version of the bill, the House included an exception to the prohibition
regarding countries that assist the United States in combatting
international terrorism. 20 7 This exception would have allowed the
President to provide a foreign government with otherwise prohibited
military assistance "if the purpose of the assistance is specifically
designed to further cooperation between the United States and the
foreign government to combat international terrorism." 208 However,
Congress removed this provision before enactment and it is not found
in the current CSPA text.2 09

203.
204.
205.
206.
Berman).
207.
208.
209.

Casualtiesof War, supra note 2.
Id. at 2 (opening statement of Hon. Richard J. Durbin).
Id. at 3.
154 Cong. Rec. 10905 (2008) (statement of Congressman Howard
H.R. Rep. No. 430-110, at 43 (2007).
Id.
See 22 U.S.C. § 2370c-1 (2006).
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While Congress may have considered including a "combatting
terrorism" exception, its exclusion implies that Congress did not wish
to give the President this discretionary exception. Despite the fact that
the current CSPA lacks this provision, President Obama has
repeatedly used "cooperation in combatting international terrorism" to
justify waivers. 210 This contravenes Congressional intent, which
indicates that the President cannot validly justify waivers based on a
country's cooperation in combatting international terrorism. Without
these justifications, the President's rationale for issuing the waivers
weakens, and illustrates a clear need for these countries to better
comply with the CSPA and international standards regarding the
treatment of children.
IV. EVALUATING THE CSPA IN THE CONTEXT
OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

Congress enacted the CSPA to further comply with the Optional
Protocol.2 1 1 In addition to mandating that each State Party prevent the
use of child soldiers within its respective territories, the CSPA also
places positive obligations on states to help implement the protocol by
preventing activities "contrary" to it. 2 12 To comply with this mandate,
the United States described, in its initial report to the Committee on
the Rights of the Child, how it was cooperating internationally by
providing humanitarian aid to help demobilize and reintegrate child
soldiers. While these efforts are laudable and certainly helped
demobilize child soldiers, the President's actions through the CSPA
waivers directly contravene the statute's intended goals.
210. See, e.g., Presidential Determination 2010, supra note 146 (stating that
the prohibition "could . . . harm the cooperative relationship [the U.S.] currently
hold[s] with Chad in combating terrorism. . ." and that Yemen needs the funding to
"conduct special operations and counterterrorism missions ..... "); see also
Presidential Determination 2011, supra note 150 ("Yemen is a key partner in
counterterrorism operations against al-[Qaeda] . . . .").
211. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COMMITTEE ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD,
OPTIONAL PROTOCOL TO THE CONVENTION ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD
INVOLVEMENT OF CHILDREN IN ARMED CONFLICT: PERIODIC REPORT OF THE UNITED
STATES AND U.S. RESPONSE TO RECOMMENDATIONS IN COMMITTEE CONCLUDING
OBSERVATIONS OF JUNE 25, 2008, 18 (Jan. 22, 2010) [hereinafter CRC Periodic

Report], availableat http://www.state.gov/documents/ organization/136023.pdf
212. Optional Protocol, supra note 82, art. 7.
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In the United States' periodic report, the Committee on the Rights
of the Child expressed significant interest in the CSPA legislation.2 13
After receiving the periodic report, the Committee recommended that
the United States cease providing FMF to countries "where children
are known to be-or may potentially be-recruited or used in
hostilities, without the possibility of issuing waivers."214 It is evident
that the Committee finds the issuance of CSPA waivers inconsistent
with the goals of the CRC Optional Protocol. The United States
responded by merely reiterating the current CSPA language; it failed
to address why it needed to issue such expansive waivers.
The CSPA's goals clearly espouse the international norms
delineated in the CRC and its Optional Protocol and with
improvements, it would strengthen and enhance current international
laws and norms that are inherently limited in their enforcement power.
However, with the CSPA's present flaws, the U.S. government's
current actions fail to implement both national and international
standards regarding the treatment of children.
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The current CSPA fails to enforce its own standards because of its
vague language and broad presidential discretion. If Congress wants
to effectively enforce the CSPA, the Act needs significant revision.
Primarily, the language of the statute's national interest waiver should
explicitly limit its scope. Congress needs to clearly define what
constitutes a national interest and what does not. At a minimum,
Congress must insert a provision prohibiting justification based on the
nation's efforts in the War on Terror. As argued earlier, Congress did
not intend this to be a valid justification, and it sends a message to the
international community that Americans are willing to sacrifice
children to further anti-terrorism efforts. 2 15
Nonetheless, merely limiting the waivers will not solve the whole
problem. If and when a waiver is issued, the President and State
Department should be held accountable for where that aid goes. In his
2010 Presidential Determination, the only assurance President Obama

213. CRC Periodic Report, supra note 211, at 51-52.
214. Id.
215. See, e.g., Chen, supranote 149.
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gave the State Department for ensuring that funding would not end up
in the hands of child soldier recruiters was that "the age of individuals
proposed for training" would be checked prior to receiving that
training.2 1 6 This may be more difficult than it sounds for several
reasons. First, children may have incentive to lie about their age if
they join the military as a means of survival.2 17 Second, military
officials often lack the appropriate documentation of their soldiers.218
Last, some countries do not have a birth registration system that
allows for age verification. 2 19
Further, President Obama's assurance that ages would be verified
only addressed the issue of military training. He did not elaborate on
how the United States would prevent money or weaponry from falling
into the hands of child soldier recruiters or child soldiers
themselves. 220 In fact, in his 2011 Presidential Determination, he did
not explain how he would prevent any type of aid from being used by
child soldiers or their recruiters.2 2 1 While the State Department could
require the President to submit a detailed plan for preventing the use
of funding by child soldier recruiters, the challenges of doing so may
make the requirement ineffective. The inability to track how countries
use U.S. assistance is the exact reason why waivers need to be rare
and limited in scope.
In addition to limiting waivers, the CSPA should be enhanced by
providing detailed steps outlining when a country qualifies for
reinstatement of assistance. As it stands, reinstatement is permitted
when a country implements "an action plan and actual steps to come
into compliance with the [foregoing] standards.. .. 222 The CSPA
also requires that countries implement policies to prevent child soldier
use. 223 When President Obama reinstated assistance to Chad, he noted
that Chad signed a U.N. action plan, but vaguely explained that,
216. Presidential Determination 2010, supra note 146.
217. Green, supra note 18, at 412.
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. See generally Presidential Determination 2010,
Presidential Determination 2011, supra note 150.
221. Presidential Determination 2011, supra note 150.
222. 22 U.S.C. § 2370c-l(d)(1) (2006).
223. Id. § 2370c-1(d)(2).
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"some portions of the action plan are still underway." 22 4 These
"steps" are limited to holding meetings on the action plan, appointing
officials to help effectuate the plan, and training military officials on

child rights. 2 25
Despite signing the action plan, the Chadian government is still in
the infancy stages of complying with the CSPA. The President's full
reinstatement of assistance occurred a mere four months after the
Chadian government signed the action plan. While it is important to
recognize Chad's accomplishments, it is troubling that the
reinstatement occurred so quickly. To ensure that a country intends to
stand by its international proclamations regarding child soldiers,
funding should be reinstated in stages or after a waiting period.
Also, while it is important to recognize the steps Chad has taken
to eliminate the use of child soldiers, this recognition loses emphasis
when considering the fact that Chad received a full waiver last year,
before it ever signed or implemented the action plan. If Congress
wants to incentivize countries to promote the demobilization of child
soldiers and their reintegration into the community, the CSPA's
language must both restrict waivers and only reinstate assistance after
the country can provide concrete evidence of its efforts.
The CSPA does not prohibit funding for rehabilitating former
The CSPA's
child soldiers or professionalizing the military.
that
the aid does
children
by
ensuring
overarching goal is to help these
not fall into the wrong people's hands. The fifth subsection of the
CSPA actually allows certain types of military education and nonlethal supplies to be sent to countries to help the government in its
demobilization efforts.2 26 The only conditions set on this assistance
provision is that the country must be "taking reasonable steps to
implement effective measures" and that the aid will target military
professionalization. 227 The fact that the United States chooses not to
use this exception and instead issues blanket waivers is evidence that
the majority of assistance sent to these countries is being used for
other purposes. But if the United States is to send aid to these

224.
225.
226.
227.

Presidential Determination 2011, supra note 150.
Id.
22 U.S.C. § 2370c-l(e)(1).
Id.
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countries, it should be to assist that country in coming into compliance
with international standards.
President Obama and other critics of the CSPA argue that
imposing sanctions on these countries is not going to solve the
problem. 22 8 Rather, the President argues that the aid is needed to help
professionalize the countries' militaries.229 For example, in his 2011
partial waiver to Congo, he emphasized that the IMET funds are
necessary to train soldiers on "human rights, the rule of law, and
civilian control of the military." 230 But many of the proponents of the
CSPA do not condemn that type of assistance. 23 1 Indeed, the point of
the CSPA is to help countries stop their use of child soldiers, and
training is a valid part of that goal. It is the President's other, less
justified uses of military assistance that causes concern and frustrates
legislators.
Lastly, the CSPA is not a complete solution to preventing military
aid from falling into the hands of child soldier recruiters. The CSPA
can only regulate U.S. government funds and military articles, and can
only control that assistance in regards to other foreign governmental
entities. The Act does not monitor the private sales of arms or
assistance, whether legal or illegal. Nor does it address rebel group's
use of child soldiers. Therefore, the U.S. government must broaden
its efforts by implementing effective monitoring and regulating
mechanisms for private manufacturers within the United States.2 3 2
While an in-depth discussion is beyond the scope of this article, small
arms proliferation has been attributed to the ongoing problem of child
soldier recruitment. 23 3 The CSPA must be strengthened if the United
228. Ruth, supranote 14.
229. Id.
230. Presidential Determination 2011, supra note 150.
231. See, e.g., Casualties of War, supra note 2, at 3 (opening statement of
Hon. Richard J. Durbin).
232. There is a dearth of international and national laws concerning the sale
and exportation of weapons, leaving significant loopholes and a lack of regulation in
this practice. Morisseau, supra note 35, at 1273-1274. This lack of regulation
presents significant difficulties for the United States to prevent its private citizens
and corporations from directly or indirectly supporting the use of child soldiers in
other countries.
233. Comm. on the Rights of the Child, Written Replies by the Government of
the United States of America Concerning the List of Issues to be Taken Up in
Connection with the Consideration of the Initial Report of the United States of
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States is sincere about its aspirations to protect children from armed
conflict.
VI. CONCLUSION
Child soldier recruitment presents a complex problem and
requires a complex solution. The United States can be part of that
solution. It has the military and political power to provide countries
Congress
incentives to comply with human rights standards.
to
sufficient
recognized that ideology and morality may not be
persuade governments to cease using child soldiers, and thus it
enacted the CSPA with the hope that economic and political
incentives would be more effective. It is still possible, but the Act
must stringently regulate the military aid provision. With revisions to
strengthen the CSPA's enforceability, the United States can help
protect children's health and safety. It is imperative that the United
States takes action to help the world's children be children, and not
miniature soldiers embroiled in adults' wars.
HeatherL. Carmody*
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